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AM E N D M E N T
ISSUE
Whether, and to what extent, a
governmental unit can take into
account an independent contractor's
political speech in making decisions
regarding the award or termination
of government contracts.
FACTS
Keen Umbehr operates a trash
hauling service in rural Kansas.
Beginning in 1981, Umbehr entered
into an agreement with the County
Commission of Wabaunsee County
(the "Commission"), under which
Umbehr provided trash collection
services for towns in the County.
The contract remained in force
until 1991, when the county com-
missioners voted to terminate it. For
two years prior to the termination
vote, Umbehr had been openly criti-
cal of the the Commission's policies
and the manner in which the
Commission performed its duties.
Umbehr's criticism was expressed
both in published newspaper articles
and at Commission meetings.
When his contract was terminated,
Umbehr filed suit in federal district
court against the county commis-
sioners, alleging that they had termi-
nated the contract in retaliation for
the exercise of his First Amendment
rights. The district court granted the
Commissioners' motion for summa-
ry judgment, holding that the First
Amendment does not prohibit units
of local government from consider-
ing an independent contractor's
speech in deciding to terminate a
contract. 840 F. Supp. 837 (D.Kan.
1993). (Refer to Glossary for the
definition of summary judgment.)
On Umbehr's appeal to the Tenth
Circuit, the court reversed, holding
that an independent contractor is
entitled to the same First Amendment
protection from retaliatory govern-
mental actions as is enjoyed by a
government employee. Thus, when
an independent contractor speaks on
matters of public concern, he is pro-
tected from retaliatory governmental
action regarding the award or
termination of government con-
tracts, unless the government shows
that the speech interferes with the
ability to effectively perform its
duties. 44 F.3d 876 (10th Cir. 1995).
(Continued on Page 113)
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Government contracts
represent a significant
amount of business in
today's marketplace.
Here, a businessman,
operating under a
contract with a county
commission, claims that
the contract was termi-
nated because he criti-
cized the commission.
The commissioners argue
that government has
unfettered discretion in
dealing with independent
contractors, and courts
should not micromanage
government operations
by reviewing decisions to
award or terminate such
contracts. Now, the
Supreme Court decides if
the First Amendment
limits governmental
discretion in the world of
public contracting.GLEN HEISER AND GEORGE
SPENCER V KEEN A. UMBEHR
DOCKET No. 94-1654
ARGUMENT DATE:
NOVEMBER 28, 1995
FROM: THE TENTH CIRCUIT
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F IR S T
The Supreme Court granted the
petition for a writ of certiorari filed
by two county commissioners to
decide whether independent con-
tractors enjoy First Amendment pro-
tection from retaliatory government
action, and if so, the nature and
extent of that protection. 115 S. Ct.
2639 (1995).
CASE ANALYSIS
There are three strands of First
Amendment analysis relevant to the
resolution of this case. First, there is
the basic First Amendment principle
that government cannot abridge an
individual's freedom of speech in the
absence of a compelling governmen-
tal interest justifying the restraint.
This broad prohibition applies both
when government restricts speech
directly (such as imposing a penalty
on speech), as well as when govern-
ment restricts speech indirectly
(such as conditioning receipt of a
government benefit on the recipi-
ent's agreement to forgo First
Amendment rights). Perry v.
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
A second line of cases deals with the
practice of political patronage in
awarding government benefits.
Political patronage implicates the
First Amendment because it
requires individuals to support a par-
ticular political party or candidate.
In Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507
(1980), a case dealing with firing of
government employees because of
their political affiliation, the
Supreme Court acknowledged the
historical tradition of political
patronage and made a distinction
between jobs that require party affil-
iation for effective performance and
other types of government jobs that
do not. In the former category of
jobs, e.g., speechwriters for elected
officials, the infringement on an
individual employee's First
Amendment rights is justified by the
government's need to ensure the
effective performance of the job in
question. As to the latter category of
jobs, e.g., clerical workers, there is
no relationship between the political
affiliation of the employee and his or
her ability to effectively perform
clerical work; therefore, government
may not discharge such workers
because of political affiliation.
In Rutan v. Republican Party of
Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990), the
Court extended the Branti principle
to include decisions relating to hir-
ing, promotion, transfer, and recall.
The Court found that disadvantages
suffered by employees who are
denied employment, promotion,
transfer, or recall opportunities
because of their political affiliations
may not be as severe as the depriva-
tion caused by the loss of a job, but
such disadvantages are injuries suf-
fered because of an employee's First
Amendment conduct.
The third line of cases deals with the
scope of First Amendment protec-
tion for public employees generally.
In Pickering v. Board of Education,
391 U.S. 563, (1968), the Supreme
Court held that public employee
speech was protected only to the
extent that the employee's speech
interest outweighs "the interest of
the state, as an employer, in promot-
ing the efficiency of the public ser-
vices it performs through its employ-
ees." And, in Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, (1983), the Court held
that not all public employee speech
is entitled to First Amendment pro-
tection, only speech "relating to any
matter of political, social or other
concern to the community." Thus, a
public employee's speech relating to
matters of purely private concern is
not protected in the public employ-
ment arena, even though the govern-
ment would be prohibited by the
First Amendment from restricting
such speech outside that arena.
The federal circuit courts of appeals,
in applying these First Amendment
principles to cases involving inde-
pendent contractors, have reached
conflicting results. The Third,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have
held that independent contractors
are not protected by the First
Amendment in the award or termi-
nation of government contracts.
Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668 (3d Cir.
1986); Downtown Auto Parks v.
City of Milwaukee, 938 F.2d 705
(7th Cir. 1991); Sweeney v. Bond,
669 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1982).
To those courts, the award of
government contracts falls within
the definition of political patronage
and the Supreme Court has restrict-
ed the use of patronage only in the
employment arena and has never
condemned its propriety in other
traditionally accepted areas such as
granting political supporters lucra-
tive government contracts or provid-
ing better services to supporters.
Moreover, the practical and econom-
ic differences between independent
contractors and government employ-
ees justify a difference in First
Amendment protection. A contrac-
tor generally has other, nongovern-
ment customers from which it can
derive income; the public employee's
sole source of income is generally his
or her job. Lastly, recognition of a
First Amendment right in these cir-
cumstances would lead to excessive
interference by the judiciary in gov-
ernment operations.
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand,
has held in certain cases that inde-
pendent contractors enjoy the full
range of First Amendment rights.
Blackburn v. City of Marshall,
42 F.3d 925 (5th Cir. 1995). The
Fifth Circuit's analysis started from
the Supreme Court's Perry principle
that every individual enjoys First
Amendment protection while noting
the Pickering principle that, in pub-
lic employment, First Amendment
rights can be restricted because of
the nature of the relationship. In
cases in which the relationship
between an independent contractor
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and government is sufficiently analo-
gous to the employer-employee rela-
tionship or in which the contractor's
speech deals solely with the contrac-
tual relationship unrelated to any
matter of public concern, the
Pickering-Connick balancing test
applies to governmental retaliatory
action. Under this test, the Fifth
Circuit has held that government
can take adverse action if a contrac-
tor's speech is unrelated to issues of
public concern or if the govern-
ment's ability to effectively and effi-
ciently provide government services
is impeded by the contractor's
speech. In those cases in which the
relationship between government
and the independent contractor is
not analogous to the employer-
employee relationship and the con-
tractor's speech relates to matters of
public concern, the Perry test
applies, and government is prohibit-
ed by the First Amendment from
withholding a benefit (such as con-
tinuing the contract) in retaliation
for the contractor's speech. Like the
Fifth Circuit, the Second and Ninth
Circuits have extended First
Amendment protection to indepen-
dent contractors in certain situa-
tions. White Plains Towing Corp. v.
Patterson, 991 F.2d 1049 (2d Cir.
1993); Havekost v. United States
Department of Navy, 925 F.2d 316
(9th Cir. 1991).
The Tenth Circuit, in its decision
in the present case, applied the
Pickering-Connick test and held
that an independent contractor
is protected under the First
Amendment to the same extent as a
public employee would be protected.
The court saw little justification for
treating the two categories different-
ly on the basis of their economic
interests. In Rutan, the Supreme
Court clearly stated that the degree
of economic harm suffered is irrele-
vant to whether or not individuals
have suffered a loss in retaliation for
their First Amendment speech.
Thus, the Supreme Court has avail-
able several different theories with
which to resolve the question pre-
sented. The Court could decide that,
like anyone else, an independent
contractor enjoys the full panoply of
First Amendment rights, and the
government cannot award or termi-
nate contracts because of the con-
tents of a contractor's speech, apply-
ing the Perry test. The Court could
decide that an independent contrac-
tor's relationship to the government
is sufficiently analogous to that of a
public employee, that the Pickering-
Connick balancing test applies. It
could decide that when the indepen-
dent contractor's speech relates to
matters of public concern the Perry
test applies, but if the contractor's
speech is of a purely private nature
unrelated to community concerns,
the contractor enjoys no First
Amendment protection under the
rationale of Connick. Finally, the
Court could decide that the awarding
of government contracts is histori-
cally accepted political patronage
that is not subject to the restrictions
of the First Amendment.
SIGNIFICANCE
This case has drawn surprisingly lit-
tle attention given its wide-ranging
ramifications. Should the Court
impose First Amendment restric-
tions on government dealings with
independent contractors, state and
local governments will face the
specter of increased litigation chal-
lenging their decisions relating to
awarding and terminating contracts.
Such a decision certainly would
cause governments to be more cau-
tious in their decisionmaking, thus
imposing restraints on their ability
to effectively control contracted-out
government services. Given the
increasing trend toward privatizing
I public-sector operations, such
restrictions pose a major concern for
government units as they spend
time, money, and energy justifying
their decisions.
On the other hand, should the
Court decide that independent
contractors are not entitled to pro-
tection from loss of government
contracts because of their political
speech, the chilling effect on the
free speech of a whole category of
individuals would be enormous.
Given the sheer number and dollar
value of government contracts,
many businesspeople would be
extremely circumspect in voicing
their political views for fear of
losing out on the economic benefits
associated with these contracts.
The prudent businessperson would
be faced with weighing the benefits
of expressing his or her views
against the cost of losing govern-
ment contracts.
Whatever the Court's decision, this
case likely will have far-reaching
consequences.
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